Lack of unity among the reformists, the inability of Khatami to face down the conservatives and the peculiarities of the constitution that gave conservative bodies so much power all played a major role in the conservatives' reversal of fortune. The parliamentary reformists' inability to cope with Iran's social and economic problems and their constant feuds with the conservatives discouraged supporters of reform among the broader population, who became disenchanted with the reformists and, finally, indifferent to their overtures. Meanwhile, the conservatives mobilized economic and social forces loyal to them, but their shrewdness in these tasks alone does not account for their success. In order to reconquer the parliament and, they hope, the Iranian presidency in the election coming up in 2005, a new generation of conservatives chose a new strategy, one that is quite different from the course they had followed over the preceding two decades.
Puritanism to Pragmatism
For years after the Islamic Revolution, the conservatives in the regime relied on their alliances with powerful institutions and did not engage the electorate directly. A new social and institutional framework undergirds the new conservative ideology. The major new institution is the Islamic Society of Engineers, whose middle-aged leaders pride 
Forces on the Far Right
Recognizing the deep changes in Iranian society since the halcyon days of the Islamic Revolution, the new conservatives present a platform in which economic development and some tolerance for individual autonomy and cultural creativity go hand in hand. But this does not mean that they will succeed in imposing their platform on more hard-line factions of the conservatives.
The extreme religious right is still powerful in many sectors of Iran's institutional life, particularly within the Revolutionary Guards and in the Baseej, a branch of the Guards some of whose young volunteers still believe in categorical rejection of the West and its "fifth column"-the new generation of consumerists. The Baseej have supplied the foot soldiers for the regime's proxy attacks on protesting students in 1999, 2002 and 2003. Many prominent members of the clergy, moreover, are still imbued with Khomeinist ideology: opposition to the West, refusal to let economic development take precedence over ideological purity and opposition to any cultural opening of the society. Even some older ayatollahs within the hierarchy who are not strict Khomeinists rejected the reformists as dangerous "innovators" (the partisans of bid'a, anti-Islamic innovation) and are suspicious that the new conservatives will diverge from the path of Islam if they are left to their own devices.
Finally, entanglement in a web of patronage bolsters the staunch ideology of many conservatives. The bonyads and the equally closed hierarchies of the ICS and the Chamber of Commerce reject any innovation that threatens their privileged status, which they claim derives from the Islamic legitimacy of their institutions. The Chamber of Commerce, which warded off many "modernization" attempts by the reformists, has not been liberalized under the conservatives, either. Ali-Naqi Khamouchi, the powerful old member of the ICS and head of the Chamber, selected the technocrat Ahmad Mir Motahhari to introduce reforms, but Motahhari presented his resignation in September 2004 after only a few months. [6] The revolutionary foundations profit from their proximity to power, importing products into Iran without paying heed to government regulations or paying taxes, since they are tax-exempt. An official Ministry of Information account told in July 2004 of how some 110 cranes controlled by bonyads in various Iranian ports, particularly Hormozgan in the south, transfer goods duty-free from ships onto trucks. These goods are then sold in the market, constituting unfair competition for importers who must pay duties and for local manufacturers. [7] The bonyads regarded the reformists as enemies in so far as they asked that the revolutionary organizations be accountable to the elected bodies and the government.
The loudest opposition to the modulated tone of the new conservatives has come from Ansar-e Hezbollah (Partisans of Hezbollah), the most puritanical branch of the Revolutionary Guards. This organization formed during the first years of the revolution to monitor the personal conduct of youth, and now it is attempting to reimpose strict rules for female veiling and gender segregation of young people in parks, cinemas and university campuses. [8] In the Majles, Mojtaba Kashani, a young cleric who is a member of the central council of the Ansar-e Hezbollah, has inveighed against Bahonar's wish not to impose the chador and permit women to wear the "Islamic hijab," a tightly knit scarf, instead of the full body covering. [9] With the backing of the daily newspaper Keyhan, this group revives the old denunciations of insidious attacks upon Islam in Iran by both the West and the Westernized enemy within.
If these brigades enforcing "Islamic" mores or other repressive institutions tied to the Revolutionary Guards are able to reverse the socio-cultural opening that accompanied the reformist ascendancy of 1997-2004, the new generation that never knew the self-sacrificing ethic of the early revolutionary years will probably not accept its predicament passively. To avert a rise in social tensions, the new conservatives will have to rein in the forces to their right, as well as promote job-creating economic development. It could be a tall order.
